Manufacturing Ransomware Statistics 2026: Latest Data on Sectors, Groups and Attack Paths

Manufacturing Ransomware Statistics 2026: Latest Data on Sectors, Groups and Attack Paths

Manufacturing Ransomware Statistics 2026: Latest Data on Sectors, Groups and Attack Paths

Manufacturing Ransomware Statistics 2026: Latest Data on Sectors, Groups and Attack Paths
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Team Shieldworkz

Manufacturing has been the most-targeted sector in ransomware leak-site data for four years running, and the newest datasets show the gap widening rather than closing. Volume is up, more groups are competing for the same victims, and the way attackers get in has settled into a pattern that is much more about your edge devices and remote access than about anything on the plant floor.

Updated 20 November, after the latest quarterly industrial ransomware data was released. This page pulls together the latest figures from leading ransomware trackers and security research teams, explains why they don't match each other, and ends with what the numbers mean for a security leader's priorities.

Key takeaways

  • Manufacturing is still number one. One tracker counted 7,551 publicly disclosed ransomware victims between April 2025 and March 2026, up 24.9%. Manufacturing led with 1,660 victims, or 22.0% of all disclosures.

  • The pace jumped, then held. Monthly disclosures averaged 484 in the first half of that period and 775 in the second half, a 60% step up. March 2026 hit 861, a record, and April to June stayed above 700 every month.

  • Manufacturing is growing faster than the average. In the first seven months of 2026, 1,183 manufacturing incidents were logged against 847 a year earlier, roughly 40% more, and already more than all of 2024.

  • A second dataset points the same way. It recorded 1,466 manufacturing ransomware incidents in 2025, up 56% from 937 in 2024.

  • Industrial ransomware rose every quarter. Incidents against industrial organizations totaled 1,020 in Q1, 1,140 in Q2 and 1,266 in Q3. Manufacturing's share has risen each quarter, from 62% to 65% to 69% (876 incidents) in Q3.

  • The leaderboard is moving. Qilin is still first, The Gentlemen climbed from 125 to 167 industrial victims between Q2 and Q3, and Akira dropped from 129 to 52. The number of distinct brands claiming industrial victims rose from 70 to 99 in a single quarter.

  • Attackers are getting in through the front door. Internet-facing VPNs and firewalls, stolen credentials, remote management tools and fake IT-support calls on collaboration platforms dominate the entry points, and critical flaws in virtualization management and CI/CD software were exploited within days of disclosure.

  • Production still stops. In Q2 and Q3 there was no observed case of a ransomware operator directly manipulating a control system. Plants went down because ERP, virtualization and identity systems were encrypted or shut off as a precaution.

The headline numbers, and why they don't match

Several trackers publish manufacturing ransomware figures that get quoted side by side, and none of them is counting the same thing. Here is what each one actually measures.

Source type

What it counts

Period

Headline figure

Annual ransomware victim report

Publicly disclosed victims, all industries

Apr 2025 to Mar 2026

7,551 victims (+24.9% from 6,046); manufacturing 1,660 (22.0%)

Manufacturing and distribution report from the same tracker

Manufacturing victims

Jan to Jul 2026

1,183 incidents vs 847 a year earlier (about +40%)

Manufacturing threat landscape report

Manufacturing ransomware incidents

Calendar 2025

1,466 incidents, up 56% from 937; all sectors 7,419 (+32%)

Quarterly industrial ransomware analysis

Leak-site claims against industrial organizations

Q1 to Q3 2026

1,020, then 1,140, then 1,266 per quarter

Survey of manufacturers that were hit

332 manufacturers

Prior 12 months

Root causes, encryption rates, ransom economics

Three things explain most of the gaps between these figures.

  1. Different denominators. One tracker puts manufacturing at 22% of all ransomware victims. The quarterly industrial analysis puts it at 69% of industrial victims in Q3 (876 of 1,266). Both are right: the second only counts industrial sectors such as manufacturing, engineering firms, transport, energy and utilities, so manufacturing looks larger.

  2. Different calendars. The main annual report runs April to March, another reports on calendar 2025, and the industrial analysis reports by quarter. Don't add or compare them directly.

  3. Leak sites show claims, not confirmed breaches. Most of these datasets are built from gang leak-site postings. They only show victims a group chooses to publish, and a posting is a claim until the victim confirms it. Treat every count as a floor for activity, not a precise total.

What matters is that every one of them moves in the same direction. The industrial analysis adds the longer view: it tracked 119 ransomware groups hitting industrial organizations in 2025, up from 80 in 2024, affecting about 3,300 organizations, with manufacturing accounting for more than two-thirds of victims.

Which manufacturers get hit: subsectors and company size

No single corner of manufacturing is carrying the numbers. Victim data shows ransomware pressure spread across the whole production economy rather than one niche. The Q2 breakdown of 747 manufacturing victims makes the same point: construction-related suppliers led with 176, followed by equipment makers with 114 and food and beverage with 70. The pattern is linked to ERP dependence, distributed sites and tight project timelines, which are exactly the conditions where a few days of downtime hurts.

The damage also reaches beyond plants themselves. In the same quarter, there were 117 incidents at engineering firms, system integrators and ICS equipment makers, and 95 in transportation and logistics, 78 of them in logistics alone. Those are the organizations that hold your drawings, your remote access paths and your delivery schedules.

It is a mid-market problem

The assumption that attackers chase the biggest names does not hold up in the data.

  • The median ransomware victim has about $42.9 million in annual revenue, and 73% of attacks in North America and Europe between 2023 and the first half of 2026 hit mid-market companies.

  • In the 2026 annual report, the $50 million to $100 million revenue band grew its share of victims from 25.1% to 29.3%, while companies above $100 million fell from 13.9% to 9.5%.

  • Manufacturing's weight rises with company size. It makes up 17.1% of victims below $10 million in revenue, roughly 26% across the middle bands, and 36.5% among organizations above $1 billion.

  • In the manufacturing-specific study, 74.4% of victims had a Ransomware Susceptibility Index above 0.4, which is classed as critical. The average victim scored 0.552, and 35.1% scored 0.6 or higher.

The supply chain consequence is the part worth taking to your board. When the mid-market is the main target, a large manufacturer's vendor list is its attack surface. A tier-two stamping plant with thin security staffing is a plausible path to your production schedule even if your own perimeter is solid.

Other industry threat reports rank the sector the same way, with one placing manufacturing first for ransomware with nearly 70% more victims than the next most targeted industry.

Where attacks land: the US is still first, but Europe and Asia are growing faster

The United States has the most victims by a wide margin, but its share is shrinking. The US accounted for 49.3% of all ransomware victims in the reporting period, down from 51.9%, even though the absolute US count rose 19%. In the manufacturing-only study, the US share of global manufacturing victims fell from 52.3% to 34.8%. The quarterly industrial data shows the same stability at the top: the US had 431 industrial incidents in Q2 (38%) and 473 in Q3 (37%).

Country ranking for manufacturing ransomware incidents in 2025:

Country

Manufacturing ransomware incidents, 2025

United States

713

India

201

Germany

79

United Kingdom

65

Canada

62

Germany and the rest of Europe

Europe is where the growth is sharpest.

  • European manufacturing victims rose 85.4%. In Germany, where manufacturing is close to a fifth of the economy, manufacturing victims rose more than 83% in the first seven months of 2026 compared with the same months of 2025.

  • Part of that is one group. SafePay accounted for 21.9% of German manufacturing victims in 2025 and is still among the most active groups in the country.

  • Germany has been the second most affected country behind the US for two quarters running: 37 incidents in Q1, 68 in Q2 and 66 in Q3. Manufacturers made up 76% of the German organizations claimed in Q2 and 74% in Q3.

  • Across all industries, year-over-year victim growth was 96% in Italy (to 188), 50% in Spain (to 160), 48% in Germany (to 281) and 43% in France (to 196).

  • Manufacturing made up 72% of industrial ransomware attacks in Europe in Q3 2025, with the average ransom demand reaching $1.16 million, more than double the prior year.

India and Asia

India is the Asia-Pacific epicentre of ransomware activity, with 201 manufacturing incidents in 2025, second only to the US. In that data, 65% of affected Indian organizations paid a ransom and average payments reached $1.35 million. For the wider region, 195 industrial incidents were recorded in Q3, a third straight quarterly rise (137, 172, then 195). India climbed from 15 incidents in Q2 to 38 and overtook Taiwan (29) as the most affected country in Asia, with victims concentrated in industrial equipment, automotive and electronics manufacturing. All-industry data shows even sharper percentage jumps in Thailand (+406%) and South Korea (+407%), which are tied to individual groups concentrating on specific countries rather than a general regional trend.

If you run plants across several regions, the practical point is that US-centric threat models now underweight where growth is happening.

Who is attacking: a crowded field with a few big operators

Two things are true at once. The ecosystem is fragmenting, and the top of it is concentrated. There were 127 active groups at the end of the annual reporting period and 146 by June 2026, with 61 new actors entering in the period. Another research team saw 99 distinct groups post manufacturing victims over twelve months. Yet Qilin, Akira and The Gentlemen finished Q2 within 15 claims of each other and together accounted for roughly a third of all industrial claims (394 of 1,140).

The new entrants are short-lived. The median lifespan of the latest cohort is 4.9 months, against 12.8 months for the one before it, and about half of 2026 manufacturing incidents came from groups that did not exist two years ago. One researcher is careful on AI: he cannot prove it is the cause, but cheaper tooling plausibly explains why so many new brands appear and fade. In his words, the growth is human and AI let more people show up at once.

Industrial victims claimed per quarter in 2026:

Group

Q1

Q2

Q3

Qilin

198

140

195

The Gentlemen

83

125

167

Akira

100

129

52

Qilin

Qilin has been the most active brand against industrial organizations since March 2025. Researchers counted 1,403 Qilin victims between July 2025 and June 2026, including 299 in Q1 2026, about one every seven hours. Manufacturing is roughly 23% of its cases, and its affiliate model hands participants up to 85% of ransom payments, which keeps recruitment easy. Affiliates have gained access through vulnerable firewall appliances, a remote access VPN authentication bypass and stolen credentials. One Qilin-linked managed service provider compromise reached 32 South Korean financial institutions: one vendor, dozens of victims. [INTERNAL LINK: Shieldworkz Qilin ransomware analysis]

The Gentlemen

The fastest riser. Just 18 industrial claims were logged for The Gentlemen in Q4 2025, then 83, 125 and 167 across the first three quarters of 2026. There were 142 manufacturing victims by mid-2026, and manufacturing makes up 23.1% of the group's activity. A leak of the group's internal database in May gave researchers an unusual look inside. Analysis showed entry through firewall and network edge devices, then Active Directory reconnaissance, certificate abuse and EDR evasion, with an encryptor that supports Windows, Linux, NAS, BSD and ESXi. The records also showed data stolen from one victim being reused to compromise related organizations.

Akira

Akira claimed 129 industrial victims in Q2 and then 52 in Q3, its first time outside the top three in over a year. The data doesn't say why, and a single quarter is not proof the group has gone away; brands trade places quickly. What makes Akira instructive is the intrusion pattern. A forensic reconstruction describes entry through a legacy VPN account without multi-factor authentication, several quiet days of credential theft and backup destruction, and only then encryption. Estimated proceeds reached $244 million by late 2025. [INTERNAL LINK: Shieldworkz Akira ransomware analysis]

Others worth tracking

  • DragonForce rose from 45 to 76 industrial claims in Q2. One affiliate used malware that abuses a collaboration platform's relay infrastructure for command and control, and the group keeps exploiting remote support software flaws to reach MSPs and their customers.

  • SafePay went from 19 to 36 claims in Q2 and has a pronounced focus on German manufacturers.

  • Play fell from 53 to 22 claims in Q2, though the FBI had counted roughly 900 affected entities by mid-2025.

  • Chaos branding was used in Q2 by a state-aligned actor, MuddyWater, for credential theft with no encryption. That is a reminder that a ransomware label does not guarantee a financially motivated intruder.

Law enforcement is applying pressure but it has not moved the totals. A coordinated international operation's June phase took down infrastructure that feeds ransomware operators with initial access and stolen credentials, yet the disruptions "degraded operational enablement rather than reducing incident volume."

Attack paths: how ransomware gets into manufacturing networks

The dominant entry points are not exotic. The Q2 conclusion is that internet-facing edge devices and remote management tooling remained the main technical way into industrial and industrial-adjacent networks, and that organizations should assume every internet-facing asset is discoverable and being probed. A survey of manufacturers hit by ransomware points the same way: exploited vulnerabilities were the leading root cause at 32%, while malicious email dropped to 23% from 29% the year before.

Entry route

What attackers are abusing

Where it was observed

VPNs and firewalls

Unpatched edge appliances and authentication-bypass flaws across multiple major vendors

Qilin, The Gentlemen

Stale VPN accounts

Legacy accounts with no multi-factor authentication

Akira

Stolen credentials

Valid accounts, browser-stored passwords, infostealer logs, credential stuffing

Qilin; 34.5% of victims had stealer-log exposure and 21.6% credential-stuffing exposure

Remote management tools

Remote support software flaws to reach MSPs and their customers; remote access tools installed during social engineering

DragonForce and several groups using fake support calls

Fake IT support

Collaboration-platform contact posing as the help desk, screen sharing, real-time capture of SSO credentials and MFA codes on look-alike domains

Multiple groups, including a state-aligned actor under Chaos branding

Exposed services

Internet-reachable SMB and remote access ports; WantToCry encrypting file shares remotely with no local payload

46.9% of victims had open remote access ports

What the exposure data says

Researchers looked at what was visible from outside before victims appeared on leak sites. Misconfiguration showed up in 68.1% of them, remote access ports in 46.9%, software vulnerabilities in 43.2%, stealer logs in 34.5% and credential stuffing in 21.6%. More than 60% carried at least one of the three most ransomware-relevant findings (a software vulnerability, credential stuffing or stealer logs), and nearly one in ten carried all three. Those exposures may not have caused every incident, but the warning signs were readable from the internet.

The survey adds the organizational side. Among the manufacturers surveyed, 42.5% named a lack of expertise to detect and stop the attack in time as a contributing factor, and 41.6% pointed to security gaps they didn't know about.

Social engineering has moved to collaboration tools and the phone

Social engineering was the most consistent initial-access theme of Q2, and it has largely left the inbox. Attackers message employees on collaboration platforms as internal IT support, talk them through a screen-sharing session, and have them install a remote tool. The FBI warned in late May that the Silent Ransom Group had escalated a campaign against professional-services firms to include operatives turning up at offices in person as IT technicians and plugging in USB drives. Incident responders documented the same group going from first contact to data theft within one business day. None of this involves malware at the access stage, so signature-based endpoint tools see very little. Detection depends on watching for unexpected use of legitimate remote tools, unplanned screen-sharing sessions and removable media that policy doesn't allow.

The window you can actually defend

Between entry and encryption there is usually a gap. The standard preparation is EDR-killer tools and vulnerable-driver techniques, credential theft and backup destruction, and in one Akira case, logging into a hypervisor and creating a new virtual machine to stage the attack. That dwell time is when the intrusion is most detectable and most recoverable. By the time a ransom note appears, it is mostly too late for either.

From IT outage to production stop: how ransomware reaches the plant floor

The most useful finding for OT teams is what was not found. In both Q2 and Q3, there was no case where a ransomware operator reached Stage 2 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain or directly manipulated a control system. Production still stopped, because the enterprise systems that operations depend on went down: ERP platforms, virtualization infrastructure, identity services and remote access gateways. There are two pathways. In the first, encryption or precautionary isolation of those systems forces a stoppage. In the second, data theft alone costs nothing in downtime but exposes customers and partners through leaked schematics, specifications and credentials.

Recent cases show how that plays out:

When

Organization

What happened

May 2026

A global pharmaceutical packaging and delivery systems manufacturer

Disclosed a ransomware attack on 4 May and took a precautionary global shutdown of on-premises infrastructure. Shipping, receiving and manufacturing were disrupted at multiple international sites; core enterprise systems were restored by 14 May.

May 2026

The North American operations of a major electronics manufacturer

The Wisconsin complex had a full network outage from 1 May, with production systems offline and staff on paper timekeeping for about two weeks. The Nitrogen group claimed roughly 8 TB and over 11 million files, including technical drawings and network topology data.

June 2026

An Australian sugar producer

Milling and cane haulage halted at two of three mills days into the crushing season. The Gentlemen claimed the attack. It is assessed with low confidence that it hit enterprise IT, and no evidence has been seen that the actor reached OT.

July 2026

A US dairy subsidiary of a global beverage company

The parent disclosed on 16 July that a ransomware attack had led it to suspend production at the unit's US facilities. No group or entry route was named at the time.

Sept 2025

A major UK automaker

UK plants shut down through September and stopped roughly 1,000 vehicles a day of production, the kind of long tail of consequences that keeps manufacturing the top target.

The pharmaceutical case is the cleanest example of a critical manufacturer pulling its own plug: an enterprise-wide precautionary shutdown to contain an IT-side intrusion, with no control system compromise at all. A fair reading is that the decision was about containing an IT intrusion under uncertainty, not about a confirmed OT compromise.

The question to ask your own team

If your hypervisor cluster, your ERP or your Active Directory went offline tonight, which lines would stop, how fast, and who has the authority to decide between isolating and running? Most manufacturers can't answer that from a diagram, because the dependencies were never mapped as a continuous chain from identity and virtualization down to the PLC. The CEO of a leading industrial security firm has said industrial organizations significantly underestimate ransomware's reach into OT because they treat it as just an IT problem. The data says that framing is outdated. [INTERNAL LINK: Shieldworkz OT incident response guide]

Extortion economics: less encryption, more data theft

Manufacturers are getting better at stopping encryption, and attackers are adapting. In a 2025 survey of 332 manufacturers with 100 to 5,000 employees, the share of attacks that ended in encrypted data fell to 40%, down from 74% the year before, while the share of attacks stopped before encryption reached a five-year high. Extortion-only attacks, where data is stolen and no encryptor is deployed, rose to 10%, from 3% the year before. The same direction shows up across the whole industrial base, with World Leaks a leading example of encryption-less extortion, where leverage comes from publishing stolen files rather than locking systems.

The money side is more mixed:

  • Survey of manufacturers: the average ransom demand fell about 20% to $1.2 million (from $1.5 million), and average payments dropped from $1.2 million to $1.0 million. Even so, 51% of the manufacturers hit still paid to recover data, and the mean recovery cost excluding ransoms fell to $1.3 million from $1.7 million.

  • Europe: the average demand reached $1.16 million in Q3 2025, more than double the prior year.

  • India: 65% of affected organizations paid, with average payments of $1.35 million.

  • United States: the median cost of an attack was $500,000, before counting long-term operational losses.

A lower average payment does not mean lower exposure. Attackers have learned that downtime is itself a pressure tool, so even a failed encryption attempt can still halt production if the response is a precautionary shutdown. Where they steal engineering drawings, specifications or customer data first, restoring from backup solves the outage but not the extortion. The claimed theft of technical drawings and network topology data from the electronics manufacturer above is the pattern to plan for.

Timing is also deliberate. 84.1% of leak-site postings land on weekdays, with Wednesday the busiest day, and LockBit 5.0 published 53 victims in a single day on 26 December 2025, when legal, communications and IT teams are often thinly staffed. Your incident response retainer and your decision-makers need to be reachable on a holiday.

What security leaders should do with these numbers

The data points to ten priorities. They are ordered by how directly the evidence supports them, not by cost.

  1. Shrink and patch the edge first. Inventory every VPN, firewall, remote access gateway and appliance management interface reachable from the internet. Treat known-exploited vulnerabilities on those devices as emergency changes, and prioritize what attackers are already exploiting, such as entries on the CISA KEV list.

  2. Close the MFA gaps you forgot about. The Akira pattern is a legacy VPN account with no multi-factor authentication. Audit every remote access path, service account and contractor login, and remove dormant accounts.

  3. Watch for your own stolen credentials. With 34.5% of victims showing infostealer-log exposure before disclosure, monitoring for leaked corporate credentials and forcing resets is cheap, high-yield work. Stop employees from saving passwords in browsers on corporate machines.

  4. Put a fence around remote tools and help-desk impersonation. Allowlist the remote management tools you actually use, block the rest, restrict external collaboration-platform contact, and require a call-back through a known channel before anyone shares a screen with "IT." Enforce removable media policy at sites that receive outside visitors.

  5. Harden virtualization and identity as if they were OT. Isolate hypervisor management networks, require MFA for administrative access, alert on new virtual machines created outside change windows, and protect Active Directory and certificate services. These are the systems whose loss stops production.

  6. Make backups survive an intruder who has admin rights. Keep immutable or offline copies of ERP data, hypervisor configurations and identity systems, separate the backup administration credentials, and measure real restore time rather than assuming it.

  7. Map the dependency chain from IT to the PLC. For each production line, document which enterprise systems it needs to keep running, and pre-agree who can authorize isolation or island-mode operation. Then run a tabletop where ERP and the hypervisor cluster are both down. [INTERNAL LINK: Shieldworkz OT tabletop exercise guide]

  8. Rank suppliers by exposure, not size. Tier vendors by observable ransomware susceptibility rather than revenue or last questionnaire date. Given that the mid-market is the main target, your tier-two and tier-three suppliers deserve the same scrutiny as your largest ones.

  9. Prepare for theft without encryption. Know where your engineering drawings, specifications and customer data live, who must be told if they leak, and how legal and communications will work when no systems are down.

  10. Instrument the days before encryption. Alert on security tools being disabled, vulnerable drivers loading, mass credential access, backup deletion and unexpected hypervisor activity. That is the window between entry and ransom note, and it is the one where defenders still have options.

How this applies to OT environments, and where Shieldworkz fits

The pattern across all of these datasets is that ransomware reaches production through IT systems that OT depends on. Defending a plant therefore means knowing what is connected, what can be reached from outside, and how fast operations can be isolated and restored. Shieldworkz is an end-to-end industrial OT cybersecurity company, with products, services and solutions for manufacturers and other critical infrastructure operators. Teams working through the priorities above typically start in these areas:

  • Know what you have. A current asset inventory and network view across IT and OT is the base for the dependency mapping in priority 7 and for spotting unexpected remote access paths. Shieldworkz's OThello platform is built for this kind of visibility and monitoring.

  • Patch what is actually exposed. Edge and remote-access flaws dominate entry, but OT patching has operational constraints that IT processes ignore. OT-specific patch management helps prioritize and schedule fixes without disrupting production.

  • Control removable media and outside access. Contractor laptops and USB drives remain a practical route into plants. Shieldworkz's MediaScan addresses media screening at site boundaries.

  • Rehearse and assess. Incident response readiness assessments and tabletop exercises test the decisions manufacturers face in incidents like the pharmaceutical shutdown above: who can isolate, what stops, and how long recovery takes.

If you want to compare your current position against the controls above, the Shieldworkz team can walk through an OT security and incident-readiness assessment with you.

Additional resources:

Comprehensive Guide to Network Detection and Response NDR in 2026 here
NERC CIP-015 Internal Network Security Monitoring Readiness Checklist for Electric Utilities here
OT SOC Foundational Guide here
Managed SOC Service here

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