FERC Approves NERC CIP-015-2: What Changes for Your INSM Program

FERC Approves NERC CIP-015-2: What Changes for Your INSM Program

FERC Approves NERC CIP-015-2: What Changes for Your INSM Program

FERC Approves NERC CIP-015-2: What Changes for Your INSM Program
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Team Shieldworkz

On August 10, FERC approved NERC Reliability Standard CIP-015-2, Cyber Security – Internal Network Security Monitoring. The approval came as a delegated letter order in Docket No. RD26-6-000, and it takes internal network security monitoring (INSM) past the Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) for the first time. If you run a NERC CIP program, the short version is this: the monitoring boundary you are building for CIP-015-1 is no longer the boundary you will be audited against. 

This article covers what FERC approved, what CIP-015-2 adds, the implementation dates as they stand in the approved plan, the points where industry commentary has drifted from the filing, and a practical sequence for adjusting your INSM program now. 

Quick summary: what you need to know about CIP-015-2 

  • FERC approved CIP-015-2 on August 10 through a delegated letter order in Docket RD26-6-000. The order covers the standard, its implementation plan, the violation risk factors and violation severity levels, and the retirement of CIP-015-1. 

  • CIP-015-2 extends INSM to Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS), Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) and supporting Shared Cyber Infrastructure (SCI) that sit outside the ESP. 

  • The first INSM deadline has not moved. CIP-015-1 still becomes enforceable on October 1, 2028 for High Impact BES Cyber Systems (BCS) and for Medium Impact BCS with External Routable Connectivity (ERC) at Control Centers. 

  • CIP-015-2 takes effect in phases: October 1, 2029, October 1, 2030 and October 1, 2031. CIP-015-1 retires when CIP-015-2 becomes effective. 

  • Your INSM sensor placement, data retention design and evidence model all need to account for EACMS and PACS traffic, not only traffic inside the ESP. 

How we got here: a short regulatory timeline 

CIP-015 is the result of a multi-year push from FERC to require monitoring of east-west traffic inside trusted networks, on the logic that perimeter controls alone do not tell you when an attacker is already inside. 

Date

Milestone

January 19, 2023

FERC Order No. 887 directs NERC to develop an INSM standard

June 26, 2025

FERC Order No. 907 approves CIP-015-1

September 2, 2025

CIP-015-1 effective date

August 2025

FERC Order No. 907-A clarifies the scope of communications covered in the EACMS and PACS directive

January 20

CIP-015-2 clears industry ballot at 84.33% (as reported)

June 18

NERC files CIP-015-2 with FERC in Docket RD26-6-000

August 10

FERC approves CIP-015-2 by delegated letter order

When FERC approved CIP-015-1 in Order No. 907, it also directed NERC to extend INSM to EACMS and PACS located outside the ESP. CIP-015-2 is NERC’s answer to that directive. The standard drafting team’s stated reasoning was that these systems can hold trusted communication paths into the ESP while sitting outside it, which makes them an attractive pivot point. 

What FERC actually approved 

Two details of the approval are worth getting right, because both are being misread in vendor and advisory content. 

It is a delegated letter order, not a Commission opinion. The approval was issued by staff under delegated authority. It adopts NERC’s filing as submitted. That means the implementation plan you should plan against is the one NERC filed, and there is no separate FERC-written schedule layered on top. 

The approval confirms the schedule rather than creating a new one. The phased dates in CIP-015-2 were designed to carry forward the structure already approved for CIP-015-1. NERC’s own FAQ describes it plainly: the CIP-015-1 implementation plan is retired when CIP-015-2 becomes effective, and the CIP-015-2 plan contains three compliance milestones, with the second and third phased in at twelve-month intervals. 

What CIP-015-2 changes for your INSM program 

Scope: from the ESP to the systems that touch it 

CIP-015-1 is anchored on the ESP. It asks you to monitor network activity inside it, for the applicable BCS, so that anomalous behavior can be detected and evaluated. 

CIP-015-2 widens the applicable systems to include: 

  • EACMS: firewalls, authentication and authorization gateways, jump hosts, intermediate systems and the monitoring systems that control or log electronic access to the ESP. 

  • PACS: the systems that control physical access to the BCS and their surrounding perimeters, such as badge controllers and access control servers. 

  • SCI: the shared virtualization and compute infrastructure that supports applicable systems. This ties INSM to the virtualization changes FERC approved in Order No. 919 earlier this year. 

  • Protected Cyber Assets (PCAs): explicitly named in the applicable systems for the later phases. 

FERC’s Order No. 907-A is useful here. As reported in industry guidance, it clarified that the extension covers communications among BES Cyber Systems, EACMS, PACS and PCAs, and not traffic between PACS and non-PACS controllers. That narrows the data-feed problem for physical security teams, though you should confirm the reading against the order text for your own architecture. 

Why EACMS and PACS are the right target 

EACMS and PACS tend to be the least monitored systems in a utility’s OT footprint. They are often managed by IT, patched on enterprise schedules, domain-joined, and reachable from corporate networks. They also hold the credentials, session brokering and trust relationships that an attacker needs to get inside the ESP in the first place. 

That combination is the reason the scope change is not administrative. If your detection only starts at the ESP boundary, you will often see the attacker after the interesting part has happened: the credential theft, the jump host compromise, the badge system manipulation. CIP-015-2 pulls the detection point earlier in the chain. 

What stays the same 

The core obligations in CIP-015 do not change in character. As written in CIP-015-1, the standard has you: 

  1. Implement documented processes for INSM that define where network data is collected, how anomalies are detected and how they are evaluated. 

  2. Retain INSM data long enough to support analysis of detected anomalies. 

  3. Protect that INSM data from unauthorized deletion or modification. 

CIP-015-2 applies those same three ideas to a larger population of systems. The standard does not prescribe a product, does not require full packet capture and does not hand you a mandatory baselining method. That flexibility is useful, but it also means auditors will look closely at how you justified your design choices. 

The implementation timeline 

Here is the schedule for FERC-jurisdictional entities as it appears in the approved implementation plan and in current NERC reference material. 

Date

Standard

What becomes enforceable

October 1, 2028

CIP-015-1

INSM for High Impact BCS and Medium Impact BCS with ERC at Control Centers and backup Control Centers

October 1, 2029

CIP-015-2, Phase 1 (CIP-015-1 retires)

INSM for EACMS, PACS and supporting SCI associated with those High and Medium Impact BCS at Control Centers

October 1, 2030

CIP-015-2, Phase 2a

INSM for the remaining Medium Impact BCS with ERC, their PCAs and supporting SCI

October 1, 2031

CIP-015-2, Phase 2b (fully enforceable)

INSM for EACMS, PACS and supporting SCI associated with all other Medium Impact BCS with ERC

Three common misreadings 

“The first deadline moved to 2029.” It did not. The first enforceable date is still October 1, 2028, and it comes from the CIP-015-1 implementation plan. The October 2029 date is when the EACMS and PACS layer arrives for the same Control Center systems. 

“Phase 2a is a one-year delay for Medium Impact sites.” It is not. October 1, 2030 preserves the original CIP-015-1 timing for the remaining Medium Impact BCS, their PCAs and supporting SCI. The new work for those sites, the EACMS and PACS layer, lands one year later in Phase 2b. 

“CIP-015-1 retires on the day FERC approved CIP-015-2.” The retirement is tied to the CIP-015-2 effective date in the implementation plan, not to the approval date. Until that point, CIP-015-1 is the enforceable version. 

A note on dates 

Source material on this standard is not fully consistent. Some trackers describe the CIP-015-2 effective date differently, and NERC’s filed plan describes the effective date using conditional language tied to the approval date and to CIP-015-1’s effective date. The dates above reflect NERC’s published schedule and the large majority of current guidance. Before you lock budgets or audit commitments, confirm each date against the implementation plan in Docket RD26-6-000 and with your Regional Entity. Entities outside FERC jurisdiction, including those in Canadian provinces, follow their own regulatory adoption sequence. 

What this means for CISOs and OT security leads 

1. Your sensor architecture may be scoped too narrowly 

Many utilities designing for CIP-015-1 have sized collection around SPAN ports and taps inside the ESP. That works for 2028. It will not give you visibility into EACMS and PACS traffic that lives in DMZs, corporate segments or shared virtualization clusters. If you are still in procurement or design, now is the time to ask whether the same platform can ingest from those segments without a second architecture. 

2. IT and physical security are now INSM stakeholders 

EACMS and PACS usually belong to teams outside the OT group. Network engineering, identity, infrastructure and physical security will all hold data feeds or change windows that your INSM program depends on. Compliance programs that wait until 2029 to start those conversations will lose a year. 

3. Virtualization raises the stakes 

Bringing SCI into scope means hypervisors, virtual switches and management planes become part of the monitored environment. Traffic between virtual machines on the same host may never cross a physical sensor. You will need a plan for virtual taps, host-level telemetry or hypervisor-integrated monitoring, and you should map that plan to the SCI definition in your CIP-002 categorization. 

4. Evidence is a bigger cost than detection 

CIP-015 separates the retention of INSM data from the longer retention of evidence needed to show compliance. As scope grows, so does the volume of both. Storage sizing, immutability controls and the ability to produce a clean audit trail of how anomalies were evaluated will often cost more than the sensors themselves. 

5. Alert handling needs an owner 

Monitoring EACMS and PACS will surface a lot of new, legitimate-looking noise: badge system synchronization, remote access sessions, patching traffic. Without a tuned process and clear triage ownership, the standard’s requirement to evaluate anomalies becomes a backlog. 

A practical sequence for updating your INSM program 

If you already have a CIP-015-1 plan in motion, you do not need to restart it. Extend it in this order. 

  1. Re-baseline your scope. List every EACMS, PACS and SCI component associated with your High and Medium Impact BCS with ERC. Separate the Control Center population (Phase 1) from the rest (Phase 2b). 

  2. Map communication paths. Document the trusted paths between BCS, EACMS, PACS and PCAs. Use Order No. 907-A’s clarification to bound what is in and out of scope. 

  3. Identify collection points. Decide where you will collect data for each path: network taps, SPAN, virtual taps, host agents or log-based sources. Note where a single point can serve both 2028 and 2029 needs. 

  4. Decide your data retention model. Define what counts as INSM data, how long you hold it for analysis, and how you will separate compliance evidence from operational telemetry. 

  5. Build the detection and evaluation workflow. Write down how anomalies are detected, who evaluates them, what the decision criteria are and how the record is kept. 

  6. Pilot at one Control Center. Prove the architecture where Phase 1 applies, tune the noise and use the results to estimate the Phase 2 rollout. 

  7. Plan the budget in two waves. The first wave is the 2028 ESP-based deployment. The second wave is the EACMS, PACS and SCI extension, which often needs different sensors, different integrations and different people. 

Questions we hear most often 

Is CIP-015-2 enforceable now? No. It has been approved, but its first compliance phase takes effect on the schedule in the implementation plan. CIP-015-1 remains the standard with the nearest enforceable date. 

Do we still need to meet the October 1, 2028 date? Yes, if you have High Impact BCS or Medium Impact BCS with ERC at Control Centers. The approval of CIP-015-2 does not change it. 

Does CIP-015-2 require full packet capture or a specific product? No. The standard is performance-based and does not mandate a tool, a capture method or a particular baselining technique. You must be able to justify and document the choices you make. 

What is SCI and why is it in scope? Shared Cyber Infrastructure is the virtualized or shared computing, networking and storage layer that supports applicable systems. It is in scope because a compromise at that layer can affect multiple monitored systems at once. 

Does this apply outside the United States? CIP standards apply in the United States through FERC. In Canada, provincial regulators decide on adoption. Entities in other regions are not directly subject to the standard, but many use it as a benchmark for their own INSM programs. 

How Shieldworkz helps with CIP-015 readiness 

CIP-015-2 turns INSM from a single-boundary project into a program that spans OT, IT, physical security and virtualization. Shieldworkz supports utilities and other critical infrastructure operators across that full stack, with services, platform and solutions delivered together instead of as separate engagements. 

  • CIP-015 gap assessment: map your current monitoring against CIP-015-1 and CIP-015-2 scope, including EACMS, PACS and SCI. 

  • Architecture design: sensor placement, collection strategy and data retention aligned to both the 2028 and 2029 to 2031 phases. 

  • OT network visibility and anomaly detection: passive monitoring for SCADA, OT and IoT environments, built for the protocols and constraints of industrial networks. 

  • Evidence and audit readiness: documented processes, retention controls and reporting that stand up in a Regional Entity audit. 

  • Managed monitoring and response: triage and escalation support so anomalies are evaluated, not just detected. 

If you want a second set of eyes on your INSM scope before the first deadline, talk to a Shieldworkz OT security specialist. 

Key takeaways 

  • FERC approved CIP-015-2 on August 10 through a delegated letter order in Docket RD26-6-000. 

  • INSM now extends to EACMS, PACS and supporting SCI outside the ESP. 

  • October 1, 2028 remains the first enforceable INSM date. CIP-015-2 phases follow on October 1 of 2029, 2030 and 2031. 

  • The biggest program changes are sensor architecture, cross-team ownership, virtualization visibility and evidence management. 

  • Confirm exact dates against the implementation plan and your Regional Entity before committing. 

Additional resources  

IEC 62443-based OT/ICS risk assessment checklist for the food and beverage manufacturing sector here 
IEC 62443-based remediation guides here

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