Securing remote Oil and Gas operations from complex threats

As part of the Cybersecurity Awareness Month, we are doing a deep dive into OT security strategy and measures for critical infrastructure. In today’s series concluding piece we examine cybersecurity measures that we recommend for securing remote oil and gas operations.  You can access the previous posts from this series here.

In the vast, isolated expanses where remote oil and gas installations are typically operational, from offshore platforms to desert pipeline compressor stations, a not so silent, high-stakes battle is currently underway. These facilities reside at the heart of our energy infrastructure, but their isolation and increasing reliance on connected technology such as IoT along with their strategic importance to national economies, make them a prime target. While the earliest proven instance of a cyberattack on an oil and gas operator occurred nearly 4 decades ago, things have not changed much on the ground in terms of cybersecurity measures while the cyber risks associated with oil and gas operations have multiplied exponentially.

The convergence of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) has more or less dissolved the mythical air gap that once protected critical industrial controls. Today, a threat actor can disrupt a pipeline or damage a rig from half a world away. The fact that state backed actors are using cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as part of their hybrid warfare strategy and psyops gives us an idea of the stakes involved.

For the oil and gas (O&G) industry, Operational Technology—the hardware and software that monitors and controls physical processes like drilling pressure, pipeline flow, and emergency shutdowns is where the cyber risk is translated into a physical risk. A breach here isn't just about data; it's about safety, environmental integrity, and economic and national security.

Before we dive in further, don’t forget to read our previous post on TS 50701 and railway security here.

Emerging threats are expanding in depth and width

The threat landscape for remote oil and gas installations is evolving rapidly. Attackers are no longer just opportunistic hackers or bored basement dwellers. Instead, they are sophisticated, well-funded, and often nation-state-backed groups with specific, destructive goals. In the last 5 years we have had threat actors working hand in glove with commodity speculators to influence oil prices as well. Just think about that for a second, a speculator who gets to know about a Colonial Pipeline scale event in advance can plan his positions accordingly and make a fortune while citizens suffer from empty pumps or inflated prices and mostly, both.

So what are the specific threats we are talking about here?

• Malware with high dwell/loiter time: This is the type of malware that helps threat actors (virtually) camp inside a target oil and gas network. Over a period of time as the intrusion goes undetected, the vector starts targeting more assets and data while awaiting a signal from the handler to unleash a far bigger mayhem. Yes, barges can be tilted and rigs can be destabilized from within.

• High-impact ransomware: This is the numero uno threat. Groups now specifically target critical infrastructure (including backups), knowing that operational downtime is catastrophic. Recent reports show a massive surge in ransomware attacks against critical sectors. For a remote installation, this could mean a complete loss of control over operations, forcing a total shutdown.

• Nation-state campaigns: Actors from groups like Volt Typhoon are embedding themselves in critical networks, including O&G, using "living off the land" tactics. They bypass traditional security by using the system's own tools for malicious ends. Their goal isn't a quick payout but long-term espionage or the ability to cause disruption at a time of their choosing. We have not even accounted for the affiliates of these groups yet who could potentially be even more destructive. Such affiliates can pass on stolen data 5 times across the world before passwords are changed or network configurates modified by the impacted oil and gas operator.

• Remote access exploitation: The very remote access (while using VPNs, RDPs, etc.) that allows for efficient off-site management is a primary entry point for attackers. Weak or stolen credentials are all it takes to gain a foothold.

• Supply chain and cloud Compromise: No installation is an island. A compromised sensor from a third-party vendor or a vulnerability in a cloud-based maintenance platform can provide a "back door" into the most secure networks.

• Insider threats: A disgruntled employee or contractor at a remote, high-stress site with privileged access to control systems represents a significant and unpredictable risk.

When digital collapses, the physical breaks

The consequences of an OT cyber-attack are severe and tangible, extending far beyond financial loss.

• Operational disruption: The Colonial Pipeline incident remains the starkest example. A ransomware attack on IT systems forced the company to proactively shut down its entire operational pipeline, the largest in the US, triggering fuel shortages across the East Coast.

• Safety and environmental catastrophe: This is the nightmare scenario. An attacker could manipulate safety instrumented systems (SIS), over-ride pressure or temperature warnings, and trigger a fire, explosion, or catastrophic oil spill. The potential for loss of life and irreversible environmental damage is real. Remember the gulf oil spill of the 90s?

• Theft of Intellectual Property: Attackers can steal sensitive reservoir data, proprietary drilling techniques, or refining process formulas, eroding a company's competitive advantage. Further, oil production data has ready buyers out there who are willing to shell out a fortune to get early access to data that can be monetized in the real world through commodity trading. Once the trader makes a fortune, the data may then passed on to other characters in the chain. All of whom may finally end up vacationing in a tropical paradise while the threat actor plans his or her next move. 

• Equipment sabotage: Malicious commands can be sent to physical equipment, pushing it beyond its operational limits. This can cause permanent damage to turbines, drills, and compressors, leading to millions in replacement costs and extended downtime. Even a days delay in production can lead to a series of cascading effects.

Compliance and governance

In response to such risks, regulators are no longer making cybersecurity optional. For oil and gas operators, particularly in the US and EU compliance with a growing body of mandates is a legal and operational necessity. Here are some of the mandates that oil and gas companies have to adhere to:

• TSA Security Directives: Following the Colonial Pipeline attack, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued binding Security Directives for pipeline owners and operators. Key requirements include:

  • Reporting: Mandating the reporting of significant cybersecurity incidents to CISA within 24 hours.

  • Coordinator: Appointing a 24/7 Cybersecurity Coordinator.

  • Assessment: Conducting an annual cybersecurity vulnerability assessment.

  • Response Plan: Developing and maintaining a comprehensive Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan.

  • Mitigation: Implementing specific controls, including network segmentation between IT and OT systems and robust access control.

• ISA/IEC 62443: This is the international gold standard for securing Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS). It provides a risk-based framework for asset owners to:

  • Segment Networks: Implement "Zones" (grouping assets with common security needs, like all PLCs on a rig) and "Conduits" (securing the communication channels between zones).

  • Define Security Levels (SLs): Determine the required level of security (from SL 1 to SL 4) to protect against specific threat actor capabilities, from casual hackers to nation-states.

• NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF): The NIST CSF provides a strategic, high-level framework (Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover) that helps organizations manage cyber risk. It is often supplemented by NIST SP 800-82 (Guide to OT Security), which offers specific technical guidance for industrial control systems.

• NIS2: Applies to a set of oil and gas companies operating within the European Union.

A security roadmap for resilience in the oil and gas sector

Protecting remote installations requires a dedicated, defense-in-depth strategy. A security roadmap should be a continuous lifecycle, not a one-time project.

Phase 1: Govern and identify

• What it is: You can't protect what you don't know you have. This phase is about establishing governance and gaining complete visibility.

• Action Items:

  • Governance: Appoint the TSA-required Cybersecurity Coordinator and establish a Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) as defined by ISA/IEC 62443.

  • Full Asset Inventory: Deploy technology to passively scan the OT network and identify every single device, every PLC, HMI, sensor, and switch, including legacy systems.

  • Risk Assessment: Conduct a formal Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment. This isn't just an IT scan; it must analyze the physical consequences of a cyber-attack on each process.

Phase 2: Secure\Protect

• What it is: Hardening your defenses to make a breach as difficult as possible.

• Action Items:

  • Network Segmentation: This is the single most critical protective step. Use the "Zones and Conduits" model from ISA/IEC 62443 to segment the OT network from the IT network and create micro-segments within the OT network itself. A breach in the business network should never be able to cross into the control network.

  • Secure Remote Access: Eliminate shared VPNs. Implement granular, role-based access control with multi-factor authentication (MFA) for every remote user, including third-party vendors.

  • Patch Management: Legacy OT systems are hard to patch. Implement a risk-based plan that prioritizes critical patches and uses "virtual patching" (using network security rules to block an exploit) where systems can't be taken offline.

Phase 3: Detect

• What it is: Accepting that a breach is possible and focusing on finding it before it causes damage.

• Action Items:

  • Continuous OT Monitoring: Deploy a threat detection solution or NDR that is built for OT such as Shieldworkz. It must understand industrial protocols (e.g., Modbus, DNP3) and baseline normal operational behavior to instantly flag anomalies, such as an unauthorized command to a PLC or unusual network traffic.

  • CISA Integration: Establish a clear process to share threat intelligence with and receive alerts from CISA and relevant industry Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).

Phase 4: Be Resilient: Respond and recover

• What it is all about: Executing a plan to contain an incident and restore operations safely and quickly.

• Action Items:

  • Incident Response Plan (IRP): This plan must be compliant with TSA directives. It must include clear playbooks for different attack scenarios (e.g., ransomware, safety system compromise).

  • Test the Plan: Run regular tabletop exercises, including CISA-provided scenarios, that simulate a "cyber-physical" attack. Key personnel at the remote site and at corporate HQ must know their roles.

  • Resilient Backups: Maintain secure, offline, and tested backups of all critical OT system configurations and software. This is your lifeline for recovering from a destructive ransomware attack.

Securing remote oil and gas operations is one of the most complex cybersecurity challenges for global oil sector participants and governments. It demands a fundamental shift in thinking, where cybersecurity is no longer an IT issue but a core component of operational safety and risk management. The shield protecting such assets may not be visible, but it has never been more essential.

Talk to our Oil and Gas cybersecurity expert to discuss your cybersecurity challenges.

Check out our NDR solution for OT operators.

Learn more about an IEC 62443 and NIST SP 800-based risk assessment for oil and gas sector here.