As more information on the first major cyber incident of the last 25 days trickles in, the revelation from Warsaw regarding a near-miss blackout at the end of December 2025 clearly serves as a stark warning and a wake-up call. This was not just another random ping on a firewall or even an unmotivated recon scan. Instead, it was a sophisticated, well-timed and multi-tactic attempt to freeze a nation during a period of record-low temperatures while conveying a unmistakeable geo-political signal.

As attacks on critical infrastructure get more brazen and targeted, the risk to operations increases manifold. Looking beyond this incident, it is not merely the risk of disruption or data exfiltration, but the potential impact on citizen well-being and the economic resilience of target nations that should weigh most heavily on CISOs and cybersecurity teams. Conversely, when such attacks are met with a proportionate security response, several positive outcomes emerge.

When more such attacks fail, the threat actors and their handlers will have to put in more resources and attention to each attack. The threat landscape characterised by commoditized attacks will ease in favor of the cyber defenders. It is therefore essential to understand how Poland was able to crush this cyberattack and jot down the lessons that all critical infrastructure operators can take home from this episode.    

Before we move forward, don’t forget to check out our previous blog post on The utility SOC roadmap for 2026, here.

The incident: A shift in strategic targeting

This cyber attack that came in waves and peaked in the last remaining days of 2025, represents a significant evolution and escalation in Russian hybrid warfare tactics. Historically, power grid attacks (like those seen in the attacks on Ukraine in 2015 and 2016) focused on high-voltage transmission or centralized generation to create maximum chaos and to generate more attention and media mileage.

This incident was different and was more layered in terms of motivations and outcomes . According to Poland's Energy Minister Miłosz Motyka, the attackers targeted the communication layer between decentralized renewable energy sources individually. Specifically they went after communications between solar farms and wind turbines and the national grid. The preference for renewables indicates a specific motivation which is to reduce the reliability of such sources as well as to target a major power generation avenue that contributes almost 25 percent of Poland's electricity. The attack on the grid was designed to destabilize the entire infrastructure during a peak demand season.

Russian hackers were also banking on late December being a period of lean staffing as well as a lag in response from the impacted cybersecurity teams.

While small scale attacks on renewable energy sources in Poland has occurred a few times before, this is the first time we are seeing a coordinated and sustained attack across an extended frontier. The Russian threat actor was trying to push through to the grid while degrading the renewable energy-based power generation capacity of Poland.

Which Russian APT group was involved in this attack?
Sandworm also known as APT 44 affiliated with the GRU (a Russian military intelligence entity) has been targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure extensively over the last two years. This group has been given a mandate from Russian Military Intelligence to probe and compromise the energy infrastructure of EU nations especially those bordering Ukraine. Such efforts are also backed by GRU's Humint efforts in the region which is used to identify targets as well as infiltrate them.

All available compromise signals including the sophistication, multi-phase intrusion effort, diversified targets and the attack on the grid all point to the involvement of Sandworm. This group is known to maintain a very high level of extended reconnaissance on target infrastructure. We can say with a very high level of confidence that this attack involved Sandworm and at least one possible affiliate that is based in Poland.

GRU will not be very pleased with the failure of this attack.

What are the key technical insights available as of now?

Here are the three ‘Ts’.

• The target: Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA protocols managing the integration of renewables.

• The tactic Attempted disruption of real-time data flows used for grid balancing. By "blinding" operators to the output of around 25 percent of the nation's energy mix (the share of renewables as mentioned earlier), the attackers aimed to trigger a basic frequency collapse.

• The timing: Coincided with a cold snap where temperatures dropped below -15°C, maximizing the potential for social chaos and humanitarian distress.

How was this cyberattack repelled?

The fact that Poland avoided a total blackout is a testament to the maturity of its Cyberspace Defense Forces (DKWOC). It is also a reflection of the level of cyber resilience that can be tagged to the power infrastructure in Poland.

The so called "digital tanks," as Deputy Prime Minister and Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski described them, rolled out by Sandworm were met by a layered defense strategy that stopped the attackers in their tracks:

• Early diagnosis: the cyber security teams identified anomalous traffic patterns in the communication protocols of individual generating sources and investigated them manually well before they could reach the central distribution nodes. A second probe launched during a window that coincided with lunchtime for the employees also met with the same fate.

• Segmented isolation: Poland’s recent investments in network segmentation allowed operators to isolate compromised renewable clusters without "tripping" the entire regional grid.

• Redundancy protocols: Automated failovers to legacy analog and hardened digital backups were triggered within the initial window. This ensured that even as communication links were under fire, the physical delivery of power remained stable.

The detection and response presents a lesson to all critical infrastructure operators everywhere.

The "Shadow Scenario": What if it the attacks had succeeded?

If the attackers had successfully disrupted the synchronization between renewables and the grid, the consequences could have been catastrophic and long lasting.

"We came very close to a blackout," confirmed Minister Gawkowski.

A successful breach during a -15°C surge would have likely resulted in:

• Cascading grid failure: The sudden loss of renewable input (which provided 25% of power even during the snowstorms) would have forced emergency load shedding.

• Humanitarian crisis: In modern, electricity-dependent heating systems, a 48-hour blackout in mid-winter translates directly into loss of life.

• Economic paralysis: Beyond residential impact, the disruption of the "Warsaw–Lublin" corridor and logistics hubs would have stalled the flow of aid to neighboring Ukraine, a known secondary objective of Russian sabotage.

Cybersecurity goals for 2026: The "anti-blackout package"

The Polish government is not merely patching holes; it is actually rewriting the playbook for 2026 while adding new chapters. The newly announced "Anti-Blackout Package" sets the following industry benchmarks:

This cyberattack proves that decentralization is a double-edged sword. While a distributed grid is harder to "kill" with a single strike, it also offers thousands of new entry points for an agile adversary. Poland’s response characterised by moving from protecting the core to protecting the edge while detecting suspicious behaviours offers both hope and lessons for CI operators. This is something we should not forget in a hurry.

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